50th Indian Parachute Brigade

The 50th (Indian) Parachute Brigade was formed at Dehli in October 1941 under command of Brig WHG Gough.

It had been the brainchild of the Commander-In-Chief of India, Robert Cassels. On December 2, 1940, he authorised the raising of a quote "nucleus of trained parachutists from which a mixed brigade of British, Indian and Gurkha parachute troops could be formed". But the British War Office was resistant to the idea, arguing that the planes and parachuting equipment were needed in England instead. However, when General Claude Auchinleck took control in India he was not to be denied, and on May 15, 1941 he decided to proceed with the Brigade's formation. The War Office agreed, but only on the condition that one Battalion was British. In the end, the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade contained one battalion of British troops (151), one of Indians (152), and one of Gurkhas (153) at its inception. It was to contain 2,500 men, which was not too much to ask considering that at that time 50,000 men were being raised in India every month. In October 1941, the Brigade headquarters were set up in Delhi with its first Air Landing School being formed at Willingdon Airport. The reinforcement unit, known as the Parachute Troops Training Centre, was also based at Delhi. 

The Brigade initially consisted of three battalions. The 151 (British) Parachute Battalion was commanded by Lt Col MA Lindsay and was made up of volunteers from 23 British infantry battalions serving in India. In October 1942, the 151 Battalion was transferred to the 4th Parachute Brigade forming in the middle east and re-designated 156 Parachute Battalion. The 152 (Indian) Parachute Battalion, formed from volunteers from 19 Indian infantry regiments, was commanded by Lt Col BE Abbott. Finally, the 153 (Gurkha) Parachute Battalion was made up of volunteers from 10 Gurkha regiments under Lt Col FJ Loftus-Tottenham. Because of the loss of the 151 Battalion, the 50th Brigade also recruited a new battalion of Gurkhas in December 1942. This eventually became known as 154 Gurkha Parachute Battalion. It was initially commanded by Lt-Col CHW Bonds.

However, in the beginning there was a severe lack of equipment, rations and planes. This was exacerbated by the blocking of the Mediterranean, which meant boats from Britain had to sail around Africa to reach India. It was so bad that the instructors at the training school were ordered to bring their parachutes with them from England with the prescient observation “you never know if they might not come in handy”. When they turned up, the 14 chutes they had brought with them were the only ones available. Meanwhile, the only planes there were two Vickers Valentias. These were biplanes which could not exceed 90 miles an hour and which were known to the troops as ‘flying pigs’. In the first jump of the training school on October 15, 1941, three officers dropped from the Valentia by accident on to a tarmacked concrete runway. All of them were injured, with Major Hopkinson breaking his back; he was forced to wear a "plaster waistcoat" for 5 months. But the cheerful Hopkinson would jump again later in the war.

Indian manufacturers soon started making parachutes, but by March 1942 none of them had passed the required tests. Meanwhile, only 200 out of the required 2200 chutes had been sent from the UK. Moreover, the Brigade had actually lost the Valentias - the only two planes it did have - as they were being used to evacuate refugees following Japan's invasion of Burma. The Valentias returned in April but were promptly damaged by bad weather. On June 14, 1942, Commander-in-Chief Wavell angrily wrote, "my parachute Brigade has been starved of help and equipment from the United Kingdom and much effort will be required if it is to play the very valuable part it might". (Praval, p.23)

Fortunately, things had already started to improve. Leslie Irvin, the famous parachute maker, arrived from the Ministry of Supply to set up an Indian parachute factory in the city of Kanpur. On April 11, Willingdon's Airlanding School received its first Hudson bomber for use in jump training, at some point also receiving a Lodestar. By June 1942, the supply of parachutes to the Brigade began to improve, with 300 a month rising to 1750 by October. Indians and Gurkhas finally began their jump training, only requiring five jumps to qualify at that time. Jumping initially took place over a racecourse which was next to Willingdon airport in Delhi. Unfortunately, an officer recalled how “on one occasion one of the company commanders landed on the top tier of the grandstand and bumped slowly down to the bottom”. On October 14, 1942, the training school was moved owing to the poor drop zones and lack of security; its new home was in Chaklala in modern-day Pakistan. They were joined there by 215 Squadron RAF which brought several Wellington bombers. The Brigade headquarters also moved to Campbellpur in Pakistan, 50 miles west of Chaklala. Simultaneously, 151 Battalion was secretly moved to the Middle East and renamed to 156 battalion. Strangely, the Training Centre remained in Delhi but it was later realised this was a mistake and it moved to Rawalpindi, also in Pakistan. 

A few small-scale airborne operations were undertaken prior to Sangshak. In July 1942, troops from A Company, 152 Battalion were dropped from Valentias near the Nara river in Pakistan. This was in an effort to curb the actions of Hur tribesmen who had been ransacking local villages near Hyderabad. On May 16, 1942, the Hurs had derailed the mail train from Karachi, attracting the ire of the British authorities. But the drop of the 152 Battalion ended in disappointment when the Hurs learnt of the plan and escaped; the need for greater secrecy in future operations was duly noted. According to the Company's 2 i/c Pat Paterson, not a single rebel was sighted on the whole Operation. On July 3, 1942 Operation Puddle was launched, which involved just seven Gurkhas and four Brits from 153 Battalion led by Captain Jimmy Roberts. They were to drop from a Lockheed Lodestar over Myitkyina in Burma, to gather intelligence on airstrips and airfields in Northern Burma. After dropping, they had to march 150 miles north to reach and reoccupy an abandoned Fort called Fort Hertz. The Operation was a complete success. 

In August 1942, the Brigade was used in a civil policing role in response to the 'Quit India' movement, which the British considered to be a "rebellion". By April 1943, 99 Squadron RAF had arrived with more Wellingtons for parachuting, but it was relieved after a month by the arrival of 62 Squadron, equipped with Hudsons. It took until June 1943 for the first Dakota to arrive at Chaklala. By May 1943, Brigadier Gough had left the 50th Brigade as he was now 43 and considered too old to command them in action, having recently smashed his leg during a jump. He was replaced by the sprightly 31 year old Brigadier Hope-Thompson, who who was considered an airborne expert and had a Military Cross to his name. Then, during the summer, Brigadier Thompson was sent to the UK to be briefed on the lessons learnt from North Africa. He returned with the knowledge that their support units had been woefully insufficient. As a result, each Indian Battalion was given a support company with 3 inch mortars, LMGs and MMGs. An MMG company was also raised for the whole Brigade, the engineer and medical sections were expanded, and a Pathfinder platoon and defence platoon were formed. The MMG Company consisted of two platoons, one Muslim and one Hindu, and was joined by Captain Pax Gaydon and Lieutenant Paul Lewis. Finally, the position of Deputy Brigade Commander was formed and filled by BE Abbott, who was promoted to Colonel. 

More changes were precipitated by the visit of 'Boy' Browning, who arrived in New Delhi on September 17, 1943. He was accompanied by General Auchinleck and Air Chief Marshal Peirse, and their ultimate design was the formation of a new Indian airborne division by the winter of 1944. But the tacit implication of their arrival was that the understrength Brigade required reorganisation. Browning's intervention had an immediate impact, including the formation of a wing of Dakotas for use at Chaklala, overseen by officers from 38 Squadron. This eventually formed in September 1943 as No. 177 (Airborne Forces) Wing. Meanwhile, the Parachute Troops Training Centre, which had sensibly been moved to Rawalpindi, was made into an Airborne Forces Depot. An Indian Army Air Corps was also to be founded, and several new senior officers appointed. For his part, General Auchinleck immediately ordered thirty officers to be posted to the 50th Brigade. However, the (slightly theoretical) 9th Indian Airborne Division, later to be renamed the 44th, was left on hold due to a lack of staff until March 1944. 

But these promising signs were followed by a series of cancelled Operations in 'Tarzan', 'Pigstick' and 'Bulldozer', which were all disrupted by Japanese offensives. After 'Bulldozer' was cancelled because of Japan's Ha-Go offensive, the 50th Brigade was allotted to IV Corps to be used in a defensive role, as an invasion of India itself was now on the horizon. Warning signs were already appearing, with the Japanese building roads and driving cattle and elephants north through Burma. The 152 and 153 Battalions were given priority in jungle training, completing it in Raiwala in December 1943. Then, in early March 1944, the two Battalions moved to Chakabama, 10 miles east of Kohima, to complete what they thought would be routine patrols. Brigadier Hope-Thompson had been informed that they would be located in a quiet part of the area while officers rotated in to the front lines to gain battle experience. In the event, the whole brigade was to be thrust into battle whether or not they were ready. The 154 Battalion, left behind in Campbellpur as it was understrength, would be spared the wrath of thousands of Japanese soldiers descending upon Sangshak. 

Sangshak

In March 1944, the Japanese launched an invasion of India's Manipur State with three divisions (the U-Go offensive). They were hoping to reach the Allied bases of Imphal and Kohima and cut off a planned counteroffensive into Burma before it even began. Their advance caught the allies off guard and a series of movements forced the 50th Brigade south to cover the space vacated by the 23rd Indian Division, who had only left one battalion behind (4/5 MLI). Occupying a large area around Sangshak to fill a gap in the defensive line, the brigade's task was to hold off the enemy while the Allied Divisions reached the safety of Imphal. This set the scene for a bloody fortnight.

The 152 and 153 Battalions, together with 411 Squadron, 80 Para Field Ambulance, and their MMG Company, made their way to the defensive area using mules for transport and lacking most of their heavy equipment and vehicles. They were ordered not to wear their regimental badges, Para wings, flashes and even smocks in order to avoid identification. However, this order was not unilaterally observed as we know of one smock with a bullet hole from the battle itself. By March 14, 152 Battalion were set up east of Sangshak at Badger Hill, with C Coy in an advance position at Point 7378. When it was finally overrun on March 20, C Company had killed at least 160 Japanese soldiers (Japanese estimate) and perhaps as many as 450 (Brigadier Richards' estimate). Of the survivors, only one party of wounded led by Lieutenant Easton reached the defensive lines of 582 battery. 20 others fled into the jungle and eventually reached Imphal in a dreadful state. Brigadier Hope-Thompson realised the remaining paratroopers needed to concentrate in one place to stand any chance of survival. After a few holding positions, the remaining men retreated to Sangshak itself on March 21. They were reinforced there by the 4th Battalion of the 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, 15 Mountain Battery, 582 Jungle Mortar Battery and 74 Field Company. They held a tiny plot of land where no fresh water was available and where trenches could only be dug 3 feet deep before reaching volcanic rock.

The Gurkhas were ordered to hold the Japanese onslaught at all costs. On March 22nd, the Japanese attacked Sangshak from the north. Despite some initial success, they were driven back by the Indians’ and Gurkhas’ artillery. Fortunately, one of the dead Japanese officers had been holding the maps and plans for an entire enemy division. The captured intelligence was sent back to headquarters and would later prove crucial in the defence of Kohima. However, on the 23rd things went from bad to worse when an Allied resupply by air missed the tiny Brigade position and landed in the hands of the Japanese. The Brigade fought desperately to retrieve the much-needed supplies but they could not reach them. Both the Allies and the Japanese suffered heavy casualties in the desperate scramble for resources. With ammunition, food and water all becoming scarce, the Brigade held on doggedly. The same day, the Japanese moved their artillery into position using elephants, which began to unload on the beleaguered paratroopers. They attacked again on the 24th with fresh reinforcements coming from the East, but the Indians and Gurkhas stood strong.

In the early hours of the 25th and 26th the defenders were forced to drive back night assaults using Kukri and bayonets. At one point, Japanese troops practically threw themselves forwards, advancing to a church within 200 yards of Brigade headquarters. Mercifully, at 6.00 PM on the 26th March, Brigadier Hope-Thompson was ordered to withdraw to the safety of Imphal, which was completed under cover of darkness at 10.30. By this time, the Gurkhas and Indians were dying of thirst, and the smell of decomposing men and mules permeated the air. The paratroopers made a heroic attempt to carry out as many wounded as they could, but 100 injured men were left behind and taken prisoner.

Retreat to Imphal

After the position at Sangshak proved untenable, the Brigade set out on a torrid march to the safety of Imphal. As the men foraged for berries and ate bark, the 152's Commanding Officer was almost captured and Majors Webb and Gillet were sadly killed. The fighting had weakened the 153 Battalion, which had 141 casualties, and mauled the 152 Battalion, which had 358. But from March 31 the Brigade finally began to filter into Imphal in large numbers. 

Those strong enough to fight were immediately sent to reinforce gaps in the defensive line. By late June, the allies had turned the invasion into Manipur on its head and had the Japanese streaming east and south, back out of India. With the formation of the 'Tarforce' on June 30, the signal to exact a strategic punishment on the enemy had arrived. Thousands of retreating Japanese soldiers were captured with the 153 Battalion's medical officer Eric Neild commenting, "reading the wireless signals (from patrols) was like listening to cricket scores". Thereafter, the two Battalions were withdrawn to Imphal on July 26, and from there to Secunderabad. 

Formation of the 44th Indian Airborne Division 

As early as September 1943, the decision had been made to form an airborne division in India. At that time, the three brigades necessary to form a division were simply not available. Therefore, two resolutions were made. First, the divisional commander and senior staff had to be drawn from airborne forces outside of India. Second, a British parachute brigade would have to be sent over, ideally before July 1, 1944. However, these early plans ran into more than one obstacle. 

First was the Japanese invasion of India, which pushed the timeline back considerably and depleted the manpower available. This led SEAC commander Mountbatten to suggest that the formation of the 44th Division be postponed. Some officers also thought that a division was too large to be used in an airborne role in Burma. General Giffard of 11th Army Group stated "airborne operations could be carried out equally well by a standard infantry formation reinforced by a parachute brigade". However, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Alan Brooke, pointed out that no major airborne operation in Burma would take place without a division. The War Office therefore ordered Mountbatten to proceed. 

Around the same time, it was agreed that the 44th Armoured Division had to first be disbanded, as its armour could not be used effectively in the jungles of Burma. This decision had already been made when Japan invaded in March 1944. However, the Armoured Division was recalled to help defend Jorhat, which held Kohima's lines of communication. After the Japanese retreated, the headquarters and divisional troops of the armoured division were poached by the 9th Indian Airborne Division, which was renamed to the 44th in recognition. Although it was nowhere near ready, the 44th Airborne Division was given the raising date of November 1, 1944. 

The new division required two parachute brigades and an airlanding brigade to reach the required strength. Fortunately for them, Orde Wingate's Long Range Penetration groups (Chindits) were already experienced in landing behind enemy lines, having done so during Operation Thursday. Therefore, the 14th (LRP) Brigade was easily reconstituted as the 14th Airlanding Brigade. 

Meanwhile, the 50th Parachute Brigade was still recovering from heavy fighting in Secunderabad. When it got there, it found the 154 Battalion in full strength awaiting them. It was therefore quickly restored, with the caveat that there were no airfields in the area from which to launch airborne operations. For this reason, the whole Brigade had to move back to Rawalpindi in Pakistan, the home of its airborne forces depot and Dakota aircraft (at Chaklala Airlanding School). By October, the entire Brigade had left Secunderabad. The Battalions now set up new headquarters near Rawalpindi, with the 152 and 153 at Sangjani and the 154 at Kahuta. The seasoned Brigade was quickly put through its paces in a three-jump refresher course. 

On December 18, 1944, the formation of the Indian Parachute Regiment had been authorised. New cap badges were issued and the 152,153 and 154 Battalions were all renamed. Previously a mixed unit, the 152nd Battalion was split into a majority Hindu 1st Battalion and a majority Muslim 4th Battalion. The 153rd and the 154th Battalions became the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, Indian Parachute Regiment, respectively. 

By January 1945, the promised third Brigade from Britain had failed to materialise. Mountbatten therefore arranged for the 77th Infantry Brigade, another experienced Chindit unit, to join the 44th Division and to be renamed the 77th Indian Parachute Brigade. At the same time, the 15th (Kings) Parachute Battalion joined the 77th. Meanwhile, the 16th (South Staffs) Parachute Battalion joined the 50th Brigade. With the 14th, 50th and 77th Brigades assembled, the foundation of a new Division had been reified. The new 50th Indian Parachute Brigade now consisted of the 16th together with the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the Indian Parachute Regiment. 

The final airborne operation undertaken by the Brigade was a successful parachute assault mounted on the 1st May 1945 by a composite Gurkha parachute battalion on Japanese defensive positions at Elephant point, at the mouth of the Rangoon River.

Attached units:                                                                                 

Brigade Headquarters - Brig MRJ Hope-Thompson

411 (Royal Bombay) Parachute Squadron, Royal Indian Engineers - Capt MJJ Rolt

50th Indian Parachute Brigade Signals Section - Capt EJ Buirski

80 Parachute Field Ambulance - Lt-Col RB Davis

50th Independent Parachute Platoon (Pathfinders) - Lt E B Hill

MMG Company - Maj J E Ball

Compiled with information from:

India's Paratroopers, A History of the Parachute Regiment of India (London, 1975), K.C. Praval 

The Story of the Indian Airborne Troops, Major-General Afsir Karim 

Airborne Assault Archive (Boxes 3 H4 20.1.1, 3 H4 20.1.2 and 3 H4 20.1.3)

With Pegasus in India - the Story of 153 Gurkha Parachute Battalion, Major Eric Neild

Article written by Alex Walker