152 (Indian) Parachute Battalion

The 152nd Indian Parachute Battalion formed at Delhi on October 15, 1941 and was part of the newly created 50th Indian Parachute Brigade. It drew men from nineteen Indian infantry regiments. The Battalion's companies were organised according to religion; A Company was majority Muslim, whilst C Company was majority Hindu. 

In early 1942, the Hur tribesmen of Sind province had begun ransacking local villages north of Hyderabad (now in Pakistan). Their actions escalated unchecked until on May 16, 1942, they derailed the mail train from Karachi and attacked its passengers. Martial law was declared and ground troops sent in, but this failed in rooting them out completely. Therefore, the British authorities decided to employ an airborne insertion to catch the Hurs off guard. Troops from 152's A Company were chosen for the task, which would also give them operational experience. In July 1942, they were dropped from Valentias near the Nara river in Pakistan. Unfortunately, the tribesmen had already learnt of the plan and escaped; the need for greater secrecy in future operations was duly noted. A wartime record notes that "five Valentia and two Hudson a/c [were] absent in Sind 1-18 July. One Lodestar detached for special operation to be done in Burma from Assam [this was 153 Battalion's Operation Puddle]. Returned 7 July and attached to AHQ Comn Flight. On return from Sind the fabric of all Valentia a/c was found to be in a very bad condition". 

Prior to its existential clash with the Japanese at Sangshak, 152 Battalion was briefed for a number of other Operations, some of which had an airborne component. One of these was Operation Bulldozer, scheduled for Autumn 1943. Indian troops were to capture Akyab (now Sittwe) in Burma, assisted by 152's B Company who would be inserted by air. However, the Operation was cancelled because of Japan's invasion of Arakan in Burma during Operation Ha-Go. In March 1944, the Japanese invaded India itself in Operation U-Go. It was this latter invasion that caught out the 152 Battalion, who were now drawn into a fortnight of desperate defence. 

Sheldon's corner (March 11 - March 21)

On March 11, 1944, the 152 Battalion reached the village of Litan, 22 miles northeast of Imphal. They were instructed to take control of a complex of positions known collectively as Sheldon's corner, east of Sangshak, from the 4th Battalion of the 5th Mahratta Light Infantry. But at Litan they had to abandon what few vehicles they had for mules as the road turned into a rough track. The only vehicle allowed after this point was the jeep belonging to Brigadier L.F. Richards, the Battalion's liaison Officer. Later on, a reinforcement Company would also be allowed to use Dodge T-234 trucks to reach Sangshak, even though they were too large to return. But they would not even attempt the return journey as all the vehicles were destroyed by March 26. 

On March 14, the 152 Battalion marched to Sangshak. They had originally been sent eastwards to gain experience patrolling the Manipur jungle, but were starting to suspect that they would get more than a training exercise. At a HQ of the 49th Indian Infantry Brigade they learnt that the allied V force, which managed the intelligence posts along the river Chindwin, had been fired upon. Reaching Sheldon's corner on March 15, A Company remained at Battalion HQ on Badger Hill while C Company was ordered to take over Point 7378, 2 miles ahead and B Company took over Gammon Hill, also a few miles away. March 15 and 16 were spent fortifying their positions and moving up stores and supplies. 

On March 17, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Hopkinson, CO of the 152 Battalion, met the Mahrattas' CO Jack Trim at Kidney Hill. Trim informed Hopkinson that at least 50 Japanese soldiers had been spotted crossing the Chindwin. This information was rapidly passed back to the Brigade Commander, Hope-Thompson. He sent the Brigade MMG Coy to Ukhrul, north of Sangshak, in response. 

On March 18, Hopkinson sent out his own patrol to see if they could locate the Japanese, but they returned having found no sign of the enemy. However, the same day some Naga villagers came up a jungle track from Pushing stating that they, too, had encountered the advancing invaders. An observation post 4 miles in front of C Company was about to be left stranded to the enemy on the same track from which the villagers came. On hearing this, C Company's Major Fuller withdrew his men from the post. During the evening of March 19, a missing V force officer arrived. He revealed that the Japanese had crossed the Chindwin in large numbers, whilst the V Force had abandoned their posts, leaving jeeps, rations and equipment to the enemy. For Brigadier Hope-Thompson, who had held a conference on training and patrols that morning, the news came as something of a shock. Indeed, his Brigade HQ was still located at milestone 36, and had to be hurriedly moved up to Sangshak thereafter.  

On March 19, Lieutenant Faul of C Company led another patrol out at dawn. This time they found 200 Japanese soldiers advancing towards Sheldon's Corner; they left booby traps and returned to their lines. Hopkinson and Trim had now set up a joint command post on Badger Hill. They soon saw 700-900 Japanese soldiers coming up the track. They were the 3rd Battalion of the 58th Regiment of Japan's 31st Division. Unfortunately, they were not yet in range of mortars and the Indians had no heavy artillery. At 9.30 AM the first Japanese attack came on two fronts. An advance post with 20 men and 1 officer was overrun, leaving only one survivor who was sent back to inform the others. The attacks continued until 1 PM, but made no progress. By then another 4 allied men had been killed and 8 wounded. 

Meanwhile, 152's A Company was stuck behind protecting Battalion HQ on Badger Hill. Hope-Thompson decided to send them forward to reinforce C Company, leaving only the Mahrattas to protect his HQ. At 4.30 PM A Company set off, whilst the Japanese onslaught continued against B and C Companies, and they were now spotted using the captured V Force jeeps to bring up supplies. During a lull in the fighting, Lieutenant Andrew Faul set up another booby trap with 8 mortar bombs. As the Japanese withdrew casualties, it exploded and killed many. C Company's Major John Fuller had clung tenaciously to Point 7378 but his forward weapon pits had now been seized. Sensing they were close to victory, the Japanese began issuing propaganda from megaphones trying to get Indian soldiers to defect to the INA. By now, 12 men of Support Company were killed or missing, another 11 were wounded, and A Company had still not arrived to reinforce. Hopkinson, who had been watching the battle from afar, desperately sent a Mahratta platoon and the remainder of A Company forward to save Fuller and his men.

In the early morning of March 20, Major Fuller started a counterattack which drove the enemy off his forward positions. He radioed Hopkinson pleading for help, but even though Hopkinson sent Major Holland of the Mahrattas, the way to Point 7378 was completely blocked. At 6 AM Hopkinson received a message that Fuller and his 2 i/c Captain Roseby were wounded. An hour later, both were dead. Lieutenant Easton, the acting Company Commander, radioed again at 1015 to finally announce a retreat to Badger Hill. Point 7378 had finally been lost. Easton, injured himself, later reached a hideout of 582 Jungle Mortar Battery with the devastated leftovers of C Company, who were sent back to Litan to recover. Having fled into the jungle, a further 20 soldiers from C Company later reached the safety of Imphal.

Lieutenant Faul and Havildar Makmad Din were both noted for their defence of Point 7378. When it was finally overrun on March 20, 152 Battalion's C Company had killed at least 160 Japanese soldiers (Japanese estimate) and perhaps as many as 450 (Brigadier Richards' estimate), though Praval states that this figure includes wounded. Acting Lance Corporal Bill Gollop, a reinforcement from A Company, described their fate:

"A track, quite near to Bn. HQ, was discovered that was not shown on the map, and I was sent with three men to find its destination. After two or three miles it hit the main track (you don't talk about roads in this neck of the woods), and it was obviously a short cut. On the way back we bumped into a forward OP (that I didn't know was there!), and they pointed out a line of fire on the other side of the valley. We then moved back to C coy's position, where John Fuller (company commander), after confirming my information to Bn. HQ, persuaded me to stay for the rest of the night. At morning stand to John invited us to eat, but as his coy was Hindu I declined the offer and started off back. Just as we got to the main track, a Jeep screeched to a stop and the OP complement piled out shouting that the Japanese were following them. As I have explained the religious difference of my chaps and C coy. troops, I took the decision that they would rather fight or die with their own kind, and promptly jumped in the Jeep and shot off back. For that decision I stand here to-day, for you will have been told what happened to C coy". 

With the news of C Company's destruction filtering in, 582 Jungle Mortar Battery and Colonel Abbot, the deputy brigade commander, arrived at Sheldon's Corner. The remaining forces at Gammon Hill and Badger Hill were agreed to fall under Trim's command. Hopkinson also requested a supply drop and an incendiary strike on captured V-Force stores at Pushing at this time. A Company, who were halfway to Point 7378, were ordered to abandon their reinforcement mission and retreat through Khangoi (Khunou), where they would collect Holland's Mahratta Company on the way back. For their part, the Mahrattas had lost 8 killed and 18 wounded.  

Brigadier Hope Thompson had already decided that Sheldon's Corner was untenable when a message arrived from Major-General Roberts at 10.45 (March 21) ordering him to concentrate his men in the Sangshak area. Major Ball, commander of the MMG Company at Ukhrul, also sent a message stating that the Japanese were approaching. Hope-Thompson told him to destroy his remaining stores and retreat to Sangshak.

Sangshak (March 21 - March 26)

On March 21, Hope-Thompson scoped out Sangshak and nearby Finch's Corner for the first time. He sent Brigadier Richards to contact Hopkinson and Trim for their opinion, and they agreed a temporary withdrawal to Kidney Hill. 582 Battery withdrew early on the 21st, as its overburdened mules were unable to move by night. Richards then went further to inform 152's A Coy and the Mahrattas' D Coy of the withdrawal. But stranded on Gammon Hill, B Company's telephone line had been tapped, with Japanese voices heard on the line. Lieutenant Alan Cowell therefore took the message personally to B Coy's Captain Webb. 

On March 22, the whole Sheldon's corner force withdrew 2 hours after midnight. But the sight of burning basha huts on the heights of Sangshak told them the battle was not over. Arriving at Kidney Hill at 10 AM, they were urgently ordered to Sangshak itself after only two hours. The retreating units arrived in Sangshak on the same day "with an hour and a half of daylight left" (probably around 5 PM), with 152 Battalion assigned to the northwest corner of the defensive perimeter. This included a small plateau overlooking the church, which was held by A Company. However, the 152 men were by now so exhausted that they merely settled into their prepared trenches, having no energy left to dig in.

At 1230 AM on March 23, the Japanese attacked the southern edge of the perimeter, occupying the forward trenches of the Mahrattas. Two Indian soldiers of the Japanese-commanded INA also slipped through the front lines to the area controlled by 80 Para Field Ambulance, but they were driven out. During the night, Sangshak turned into a hellish scene as the huts sitting atop the plateau were set alight. But by the morning, 89 Japanese men had been killed with nothing to show for it. At the same time, one of the three slain Japanese officers had forfeited a major bounty in the form of maps and intelligence for two entire divisions. Hope Thompson sent these to IV Corps headquarters in the hands of Captain Allan, his Intelligence Officer. 

Although March 23 saw few daytime attacks, Japanese snipers created a constant sense of jeopardy. That day, Lieutenants Seaton, Patterson and two other men from the 152 were seriously injured by sharpshooters, some of whom were in the trees. An unnamed paratrooper recalled:

"That day, four or five paratroopers were killed or wounded, one after the other, while going from one trench to another near my post. Lots of shelling was going on, and we thought they had been hit by splinters. When some more men fell at the same spot, we found it was rifle-fire that was mowing them down. But the quarter from which the fire came could not be located till Captain [Alan Thomas] Johnson, battalion intelligence officer, noticed a slight trembling of leaves in a big tree near-by. He at once took position and began to pump fire into the spot where the leaves had trembled. Nothing happened. Captain Johnson then asked a paratrooper to go up to the tree, and himself climbed after him. Soon he shouted "I got him". The Jap sniper was in the branches, securely tied to them; but he was dead, his body riddled with bullets from Captain Johnson's gun". [Johnson was killed on March 26]

By now, the Japanese were also firing freely onto the brigade watering point at the school, rendering it inaccessible. But at the very least Hopkinson's request for a supply drop was supposed to bear fruit that afternoon, and it contained gallons of water. He describes the subsequent turn of events:

"We watched our urgently needed supplies drift away over the jungle, to be collected by the Japanese. One aircraft however came very low and made a number of runs so that we were able to collect the entire aircraft-load. The pilot was magnificent; each time he made his run so low that we could see him waving to us, and the despatchers in the doorway.  All subsequent supply drops were of the same pattern. Of every flight on subsequent days we could only rely on being able to collect this one aircraft's load". 

Despite the individual pilot's heroics, the men were still forced to collect rainwater in their mess tins that evening. 

At noon on March 24, another column of Japanese could be seen advancing from the east, this time with elephants and trucks. They brought up artillery which obliterated a B Coy post at 1400. This developed into an all-out attack on the 152 Battalion at the church, during which the radio aerial at brigade headquarters was destroyed by a shell and had to be replaced. At 4, close air support arrived in the form of Hurricanes. But, like the resupply, it was chaotic, as Hopkinson explains:

"Some of our own positions were shot up as well. As I was watching the fighters from the battalion command-post, one came straight at it. We just had sufficient time to lie flat on the floor before the post was riddled with machine-gun fire". 

At half past midnight on March 25, the Japanese made another concerted effort to take the church. Having been infiltrated by Japanese snipers, it was temporarily held by 152's Lieutenant Cowell. Cowell forced the snipers out with hand grenades, and "after being nearly overrun, was ordered to pull back through our position. Before doing so, he set fire to the thatched roof which would have at least exposed any snipers". Cowell also set fire to piles of brushwood near the church which were blocking his men's fire. As he left, Cowell carried the mortally wounded Captain Christopher Gaydon to friendly lines, where he would later be buried. For his actions, Cowell was awarded the Military Cross, dated April 9th 1944; Havildar Mohammed Ali was awarded the Military Medal for the same engagement. But the platoon holding the church was thereafter forced to retreat, leaving only a listening post.

At 7 AM on March 25, a new platoon of the 152nd rotated in to reoccupy the church. But it was so dangerous at night that the building was again vacated. 

On March 26, after a massive artillery bombardment, three companies of the Japanese began their final attack against 152's A Coy. By 530 AM, Company Commander Major Gillet was badly hurt. Hopkinson described the day's events:

"They broke into the position but were driven out several times during the next few hours; but still they came on. Fighting took place inside the church itself. Eventually they gained this dominating point after the garrison had all been killed or wounded, and we were unable to retake it. They had the advantage of overwhelming numbers and were able to use fresh troops for each attack. They were now well into this corner of the perimeter and into the gun and mortar battery positions despite a very gallant resistance put up by the gunners. Both Major Smith and Major Locke, commanding officers of the Mortar and Mountain batteries, were killed fighting bravely in counter-attacks to save their battery positions. In the 152nd, all the company commanders had been killed. Our weapon-pits were shambles of dead and dying, both our own and Japanese. It was impossible to be certain as to the fate of the individuals. All that could be done afterwards was to classify individuals officially as missing though one was certain in one's own mind that they must have been killed or died of wounds.

The brigade commander tried to restore the situation by using his only reserve, the Brigade Headquarters Defence Platoon. The platoon had been formed from Marathas of 152nd Battalion and was commanded by Lieutenant Robin de la Haye (a young officer whose career at Oxford had been broken up by the war). The platoon's counter-attack was met by withering fire from Japanese light machine-guns and mortars from the edge of the surrounding jungle as they tried to fight their way to the church. The platoon was overwhelmed and Robin killed.

At battalion headquarters, I decided to make another effort to restore the position and together with Major Steward, my second-in-command, collected every man we could find from amongst headquarters personnel - runners, signallers, orderlies and so forth - and counter-attacked to get back the church position. It was very much a forlorn hope. After fierce fighting we got back into some of the old positions, but were caught in a counter-attack from the flank and, largely due to our lack of grenades, could not hold them". 

Hopkinson was now gravely wounded. But the Brigade realised that without holding the church area, the whole of Sangshak would be overwhelmed. Two further Mahratta platoons were lost in counterattacks on the church, and a third attack at 9 AM by a platoon from the 153rd was unsuccessful. Fortunately, Captain Roberts of 153's A Company managed to put in a successful counterattack, restoring the defensive perimeter without reoccupying the church itself. At the same time, the 153rd took over parts of the 152nd's perimeter as the latter was now much reduced in strength.  

At 6 PM on March 26, a wireless message finally arrived from the 23rd Division ordering the 50th Brigade to withdraw. They were to march from Sangshak to Imphal, around 35 miles away. Hope-Thompson decided that speed was of the essence, with the men marching out at 1030 that night. This left them four hours to figure out which casualties could survive the journey. Lt Col. Davis, OC of 80 Para Field Ambulance, personally volunteered to stay behind and evacuate as many wounded as possible whilst tending to the safety of those who remained. But Hope-Thompson knew this would get him killed and refused the gesture, instead ordering men of all units to help with the evacuation. Thereafter they left Sangshak through the southern perimeter, where the Mahrattas were stationed. However, 100 men who were seriously wounded had to be left behind.

While the battle of Sangshak devastated the entire 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, the 152nd Battalion was by far the worst hit. It had suffered 358 killed, wounded and missing, consisting of 23 Officers, 7 Viceroy's Commissioned Officers and 328 Indian ORs. It was in dire need of replenishment if it was ever to return to fighting strength. However, Praval estimates that over 2000 Japanese men were killed or wounded between March 19 and March 26. Tactically, the 152nd Battalion had given their allies a crucial window with which to reinforce Imphal and Kohima, where the momentum of Japan's invasion would ultimately be destroyed.  

Withdrawal to Imphal

After leaving Sangshak, the 50th Brigade faced a three-day slog to Imphal, at a minimum. Hopkinson described the arduous journey:

"Nearly everyone was terribly hungry, and any party who had a grenade or two left were fortunate as they could then obtain fish from the streams by dropping a grenade into one of the numerous pools. Wild animals were shot but the noise was likely to attract any Japanese patrols in the neighbourhood. Many tried eating leaves, bark off trees and wild berries, but did not find them very sustaining".

Those who were in stretchers could not be carried up the mountain slopes, and had to be left in the hands of friendly local villagers. Already wounded at Sangshak, 152's Major Webb and Major Gillet sadly perished on the way to Imphal.  Praval also relates the story of Captain Rangaraj, the 152 Battalion's medical officer, who randomly stumbled into some Japanese soldiers in the jungle but managed to shoot first. Meanwhile, Hopkinson adds, "perhaps the most extraordinary escape was that of Lieutenant Seaton of the 152nd. He had been shot through the mouth, and at the time of the breakthrough was left lying in a slit trench near the Field Ambulance, having been given a dose of morphia: no one had found him. On coming to, hours later, he saw a Japanese sitting by him examining his personal belongings. By feigning death, he was able to draw his fighting knife, kill the Japanese and crawl away into the jungle, eventually making his way back to Imphal". At one point, Hopkinson himself was almost caught, as he recalls:

"Captain Richards went forward to make a reconnaissance of the village to see whether there were any signs of Japanese occupation. Whilst he was away, [deputy brigade commander] Abbott and myself lay behind some bushes near the edge of the track. Suddenly we heard a party of Japanese with mules coming along the track towards the village. The only thing we could do was to stay still and hope that we would not be seen. The Japanese started shouting and opened fire on us. We tried to make for the nearest patch of thick jungle. Because of wounds I was unable to run, and rolled down the slope into the jungle below. Colonel  Abbott came down after me. We finally landed up in some thick jungle with bullets flying around us. We managed to crawl under some low bushes and lay hidden whilst the Japanese searched for us, prodding around in the bushes with their bayonets; they came within a few feet of us. Fortunately there was only an hour or so of daylight left and they gave up the search as soon as it was dark". 

After six days starving and lost in the jungle, the shattered remnants of the 152 Battalion were found by a troop of allied tanks and instantly given rations. From March 31, they began to filter in to Imphal. But the injured Brigadier Hope-Thompson had to be admitted to hospital and then sent home to the UK. Out of necessity, Colonel Abbott therefore became 50th Indian Parachute Brigade's commander. Lacking full brigade strength, the remaining airborne units would not fight as a brigade after reaching Imphal. They were kept out of heavy engagements and split up so the intact units could help reinforce the defensive area wherever needed.

Initially, the 152 Bn, Brigade HQ and the Brigade Signals detachment were used as a mobile reserve in the northeastern 'Catfish Box' where they fought alongside a company of the West Yorkshires. On April 21, 25 men of the 152 finally made it back to Imphal. Thereafter, it was suggested that the battalion replenish itself with personnel who were not parachute trained, but they refused as the new recruits could not be kept on. Instead, the 152 reorganised itself into three light companies from those who remained. Then, in early June, the battalion was ordered to join the 80th Brigade of the 20th Division on the hills astride the Imphal-Kohima road. Meanwhile 152's B company, commanded by Major Monaghan, were rapidly converted into a mobile reserve of the 100th Brigade on the night of June 9th, 1944.  The following day, it was discovered that the Japanese had captured Bastion hill, which threatened Brigade headquarters. Although a separate battalion attempted a counterattack supported by tanks, it was not successful. Monaghan's B company stepped in to the fray and were at once faced with heavy opposition from LMGs and grenade dischargers. Shot through the thigh, Monaghan continued to lead his men through an assault that culminated in a victorious bayonet charge. 152's Monaghan and Jemadar Abdul Rehman were awarded the Military Cross for their bravery. At the end of the month, the Japanese ordered a general retreat.

On June 30, Lieutenant Colonel G.L. Tarver of the Baluch Regiment formed the 'Tarforce', a unit intended to prevent the escape of the Japanese invaders back south and east. It consisted of the 152 Battalion, the 153 minus C Company, and a company of the 1st Devons and 4th Madras.  It reached Tangkhul Hundung on July 5 and formed its headquarters there. It helped to inflict massive losses on the Japanese as they retreated. Major Neild summed up the situation with the comment "reading the wireless signals (from patrols) was like listening to cricket scores". Tarforce was disbanded on July 23 and the 50th Para Brigade moved back to Imphal on July 26. Their return march through the Naga villages revealed how badly the local population had suffered during the invasion. Although both villagers and paratroopers were depleted by months of fighting, instances of sharing and hospitality were widespread. Nevertheless, the 152 and 153 Battalions were dirty, hungry and tired, and Praval records that a mobile bath unit was set up in Imphal to welcome them, along with new clothes. Thereafter they were withdrawn to Secunderabad. 

In March 1945 the Battalion reformed into two battalions: the 1st and 4th Battalions of the Indian Parachute Regiment as part of the formation of the new 44th (Indian) Airborne Division. The battalion was disbanded on October 26, 1946. 

Article currently under development

Commanding Officers:

1941-3        Lt Col BE Abbott
1943-4        Lt Col P Hopkinson
1944-5        Lt Col J Martin

Compiled with information from:

India's Paratroopers, A History of the Parachute Regiment of India (London, 1975), K.C. Praval 

The Story of the Indian Airborne Troops, Major-General Afsir Karim 

With Pegasus in India - the Story of 153 Gurkha Parachute Battalion, Major Eric Neild

Airborne Assault Archive (Boxes 3 H4 20.1.1, 3 H4 20.1.2 and 3 H4 20.1.3)

Article written by Alex Walker