Italian Airborne Forces with the Axis & Allies in WW2

In October 1918 Brigadier General “Billy” Mitchell (US Army Air Corps) had received orders from General Pershing to develop plans for a mass parachute drop of (then untrained) US Army personnel (nr Metz) to break the deadlock in trench warfare encountered on their arrival on the Western Front.  He and, the then Maj Lewis Brereton (later Lieutenant General and Commander of the Allied 1^st Airborne Army) developed plans using US infantry and British and Italian bombers to deploy a force behind German lines.  

Unbeknownst to these titans in the conceptual development of airborne warfare, Italian forces had already deployed, albeit in a penny packet of three officers, troops on the first recognisable airborne operation. These officers conducted an intelligence gathering mission in advance of an Italian offensive against Austrian forces – a role still in the hands of today’s Italian “paracudisti”.

The end of WW1 saw a swing toward a more defensive posture across the majority of the combatant nations, with no thought given to the offensive opportunities that a parachute or air-landed force could provide. The nations under totalitarian political control, however,  Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, were exposed to Soviet Russian displays of parachute deployed offensive capability at exercises in the 1930s.

Italy’s 1^st Moves

There are two men who can be credited with starting the development of an Italian parachute arm, prior to the Soviet displays, Generals Allesandro Guidoni and (the later Marshal) Italo Balbo.  Guidoni, personally insisted (despite being 47!) on testing a new design of parachute, but was killed in April 1927, when the canopy failed.   Balbo was present at the display given at Cinisello in November 1927 when all paratroopers landed safely and deployed in front of a crowd of senior officers. Balbo received the reports from the Soviet manoeuvres in the mid-30s and charged the Italian Army and Air Force to develop an operational capability.

Missing however, from Italy’s development was an agreed doctrine for the operational employment forces.  This would delay development and deployment of the Italian Airborne Arm. General Staffs Memoranda in 1936 and an Executive Order (RDL 220) in February 1937 were issued, ut despite significant support from Italy’s Fascist leader, Mussolini, (who saw the prestige element in having the new capability) significant issues (mainly financial) persisted in the development process. 

The 1^st Italian Parachute Unit

In March 1938 however, Balbo, now Governor of Libya, ordered the establishment of the first dedicated Italian parachute unit within the Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali (RCTC) using colonial funding. This formed “Order No64” – which established both the parachute school at Castel Benito Airfield, south of Tripoli and the 1st Battalion of the Air. This unit was recruited from Libyan volunteers officered by Italians.  The School employed a two phase ground/air programme that could still be recognised today.  The first course for Italian officers and instructors – the Infantry of the Air, and the second for the first members for the Parachute unit – the Libyan Ascaris of the Air.

Parachute training at Castel Benito, however, had a high failure rate necessitating a redesign of the Salvator parachute – further delaying the full operating capability of a Italian parachute force. From January to March 1939, the General Staffs looked at a doctrinal change and potential larger scale deployment  – Balbo’s concept of operations still looked at the small scale deployment personal of lightly equipped paratroops, in a raiding role.  The General Staffs Memoranda (November 1939) now looked to develop an Airborne Corps of 7000 paratroopers, supported by a further 13000 airlanded and support troops, equipped appropriately. Truly the Infantry of the Air.

Doctrinal Changes and Training in Italy

70km north of Rome at Tarquinia, a low grade airfield had been identified as the second parachute school – the decision to use Tarquinia was signed off on 29 August 1939 – it needed work. The outbreak of war on 1^st September, did not generate any discernible motivation to increase the pace of force development - possibly due Mussolini’s decision to remain neutral(albeit temporarily).  Indeed, it wasn’t until January 1940 that the school received its first staffs.  It was a “separate” school, as it was to employ different recruitment standards and a training methodology discrete from Castel Benito.  The new 8 month training course had an extremely complex, multi-faceted, programme of airborne warfare disciplines; it included a sophisticated jump tower.  Italy was to have parachute and airlanded force.

The “train the trainer” courses were completed in May 1940.  Italy declared war on Great Britain and the other Western European nations on 10^th June 1940, the first student course commenced on 10^th July. Volunteers came from trained elements of the Bersaglieri and Alpini.

The major successes presented by Germany’s Fallschirmjaeger (the Luftwaffe’s parachute arm) in the offensives against Poland, Norway & Denmark and in the Low Countries, turned heads in Rome, with Balbo’s small-scale raiding concept of operations was now forgotten. 

Improved parachutes were developed and equipment similar to the German examples were developed including, specific to arm helmets, coverall camouflage smocks, boots, knee pads and specialist webbing.  A wider issue of submachine guns (the Beretta M38A) achieved a local firepower advantage. Doctrinally, an increased number of officers were established at platoon level, to facilitate command and control on landing – lessons were identified from the German Operation Mercury (Crete).

Folgore – “Lightning”

As personnel passed through their training the structure of the parachute arm changed and in September 1941, the “1^st Divisione Paracudisti Folgore” was established – 2 Regiments each of 3 battalions (the battalions remained small in scale – approximately 2/3 the scale of British Para battalion), a 3^rd Regiment was added as the Division was prepared for Operation “C3” a potential parachute operation (June 1942) to take the strategically vital, British controlled, island of Malta – only 90 miles from the Italian coast.  It was designed to be a joint German/Italian operation, but high level disagreements between the German and Italian commands saw the operation cancelled despite the apparent Italian enthusiasm.

With C3/Malta cancelled, Division Folgore, was without an airborne operation that it was now highly trained for and instead, Folgore’s lightly armed and equipped paratroopers were pushed into North African desert battles they were ill-prepared for. Initial actions at Alam Halfa, Deir Alinda and Operation Lightfoot, saw the Folgore learn the lessons of desert warfare, but its determined stand during the 2^nd Battle of El Alamein in Oct/Nov 1942 was a significant delay to Montgomery’s the 8^th Army’s advance.  It is estimated that approximately Folgore 1000-1500 killed and wounded with 500 taken prisoner.  The retreat to Tunisia saw the surviving 600 Folgore troopers join with elements of the Trieste Armoured Division fight against Foreign Legion and Commonwealth troops at Takrouna and until the fall of Tunis.

Nembo –“Nimbus”

Discussions concerning the development of a second divisional strength parachute unit had been ongoing since earlier in 1942.  A formal proposal was submitted in July and agreed in November 1942. The cancellation of Operation C3/Malta allowed a formation cadre from Folgore.  The establishment of a 2^nd Division, however necessitated the establishment of a new jump school at Viterbo, with a changed training programme to facilitate the increased output. This resulted in a  noticeable qualitative difference between Divisions  Folgore and Nembo.  Recruitment standards had declined and the disciplinary standards were lower. At the end of May 1943, the new Division Nembo were deployed in the defence of the island of Sardinia. Smaller elements were also deployed to Corsica. One might like to think that the Allied deception plan “Operation Mincemeat” may have played some role in the deployment given the concurrent timeline.

[NB: A third Division “Ciclone” was under construction, but its establishment was halted by Operation Husky (Sicily)]

Italy Invaded & the Armistice                  

On 10 July 1943 Allied forces landed on Sicily - Operation Husky, which of course, included British 1^st Airborne Divisions operation’s Ladbroke and Fustian. Some Nembo elements had been diverted from Corsica to Sicily but, were ordered to evacuate before engaging and returned to the Italian mainland through Messina. In the period between the fall of Sicily, the Mussolini’s fall and the surrender on 8 September 1943, Nembo personnel on Sardinia sided with the German command and had been evacuated to the mainland.  The unit was effectively broken up.

[NB: Small numbers of Nembo and other elements were reconstituted in northern Italy and continued to support the Axis cause under the name “Folgore” as part of Mussolini’s RSI.]

Allied Co-Belligerent Operations – Folgore/Nembo – F Recce Sqn

F Recce Squadron was formed in Autumn 1943 by British Army Captain “Kym” Isolani (Int Corps) who operated in a loosely defined role (under the name of “Arnold” – he was half Italian) in HQ 13 Corps.  He had interviewed a number of disaffected Italian Folgore Parachutists soon after the Armistice and was allowed to form a specialist unit of Italian patriot “paracudisti” dedicated to ejecting the Germans. Italian co-belligerent parachute operations had begun. They conducted a mixture of intelligence gathering and sabotage operations in the 13 Corps AOR, some north of the Sangro.  The majority of the early F Recce personnel were from the original Folgore Division, some from Nembo, others from the Arditi Special Forces units.

Squadron’s command later devolved in 1944 to Major Carlo Gay, late of 3^rd Bn Nembo, but with direction from British 13 Corps intelligence officers Captain M Birch and Maj A Ramsey (SAS/SOE?). General Harding (GOC 13 Corps) had a positive opinion of the unit’s capabilities, and he commended F Recce to GOC 8^th Army Gen McCreery.  As the campaign in Italy drew to a close, this positive opinion ensured that Italian parachutists from F Recce were given the opportunity to volunteer for the last airborne operation in the Italian Campaign – Operation Herring.

Operation Herring.

Operation Herring’s mission intent was to; attack the withdrawing German forces, sabotage of telephone lines, damaging lines of communication (road and rail) and, last but not least, the saving of bridges and other structures that might be useful to the progression of the Allied advance.

F Recce, under Captain Gay, determined that rather than ask for volunteers the unit would jump as a whole.  Alongside F Recce, a similar scale volunteer cadre of former Nembo parachutists would also jump on Operation Herring. Both elements were trained in operating with British supplied equipment, X-type parachutes, the fully loaded leg bag, British HSAT helmets, FS Knives and uniforms.

On the night of 19^th April 1945, 113 Italian Parachutists from F Recce Sqn, and 111 from Nembo, jumped behind German lines south of the Po river. Captain Birch (and at least 1 x NCO) jumped with F Recce as part of a liaison team. Nembo was assigned a DZ at Poggio Rusco (Mantova) and Revere-Ostiglia on the Po, while F Recce Squadron DZ was further southwards, at Mirandola, Medolla, S. Felice Sul Panaro and Finale Emilia. 14 C-47 aircraft took off from Rosignano-Solvay airport (near Leghorn). Before they left, Gen. McCreery sent a good luck message. Over the DZ, the aircraft were met by intense flak, and in spite of the difficult operating conditions the parachutists departed the aircraft between 3000 and 1000 feet. However, the planned DZs weren’t clearly marked and some sticks landed as far as 40 kilometres far from their expected location.

The German reaction was rapid, but the Italian parachutists, mostly acting on their own initiative and scattered in small groups, attacked everywhere, German facilities, sabotaging logisitcs, ambushing vehicles, barring or mining withdrawal routes, defusing booby-traps placed by the Germans to slow down the Allied advance. This action, which lasted 36 hours, some 12 hours longer than expected in any case, carried on in the following days. The German losses were estimated as:

481 dead and 1083 prisoners
44 vehicles
150 vehicles captured including 6 armoured cars, two tanks and five guns
77 telephone lines destroyed and 3 bridges saved from German destruction.

Italian Parachutist Casualties were considered limited by the measure of the day with the loss of 19 men from NEMBO and12 from F Recce Squadron.  Immediately after Operation Herring F Recce and Nembo received notes from both Generals Harding and McCreery commending their actions on Op Herring. 

Italian Parachute Units Today

Today, the names Folgore and Nembo live on in the Italian Armed Forces – the Folgore Brigade provides a parachute and airlanded mobile brigade group, with a Folgore and Nembo parachute infantry regiments, the Brigade Group retains its own organic, artillery, engineering and logistic capability, with an attached unit of armour. These are centred around the HQ in Livorno, which is close by the parachute training centre at Pisa – which also houses the Museo Storico delle Aviotruppe (or Museum of Airborne Troops).

Further reading suggestions:

The Italian Folgore Parachute Division: North African Operations 1940-43 - Paoli Morisi,  (Helion, 2016)

Infantrymen of the Air: An Operational History of the Royal Italian Airborne Forces in the Second World War, 1936-1943 - Jeffery WS Leser, (Helion, 2023)

F Squadron - Carlo Bonciani (Dent, 1947) 

A number of other books are available on F Recce Sqn, mostly published in the last 10 years, but sadly not in an English edition.

Written and researched by Mark Pitt