Lessons learnt on Airborne Operations.

1). Experience in UK and North Africa and reports from Sicily suggested that 1^st priority equipment must be carried on the man, and in the planning for Op ‘Dragoon’ this policy was adopted. The failure to collect pre-release containers and the failure of re-supply on this operation proved the policy to be correct. Each man in the stick of 17 jumps with a Rucksack or Stretcher Bundle using our own type of neck harness and quick-release mechanism which has proved most successful in producing a ‘quick stick’ and ensuring that the man does not become separated from his load.

2). Although casualties in this Op were fewer than expected it was evident that there were not sufficient Orderlies available in the M.D.S. and that at least one more ‘stick’, i.e: 3 instead of 2 must be dropped on future Ops. This was confirmed on Op ‘Manna’ where, because of the failure of gliders to reach the L.Z. Area and the immediate dispersal of troops after landing, only 22 Orderlies were available to look after 100 casualties. (N.B: This was not put into effect for Op ‘Manna’ because an unopposed landing was anticipated, and the shortage of A/C).

3). Experience proves that in organising the medical-layout the aim must be prompt, adequate surgery rather than the collection of casualties for treatment subsequently by the relieving force. In order to do this it is essential that adequate equipment be included for proper post-operative nursing, therefore many items of heavy equipment for better operative facilities and for proper nursing must be brought in by glider. In the light of experience in France and Greece we worked out the minimum requirements in equipment of an Advance Surgical Centre and found that to treat 100 cases and hold them for three days approximately 5 tons of equipment are necessary, and that for each additional 100 cases a further 2 tons are required. The smallest number of officers and men sufficing to run a Surgical Centre (including 2 Surgical Teams) is 65. Glider space is usually scarce and must be reserved for heavy equipment, so that nearly all the men are required to parachute. Each of the parachute Medical Orderlies carries on average over 30 lbs of operational equipment in his Bergan Rucksack or Stretcher Bundle. The amount of medical equipment got down on the parachutists is thus over 65 x 30 = 1950 lbs (1 Ton approx.) – the remaining 4 tons required including all heavy articles, such as a 1-kw generator, theatre tables, Oxford vapourisers, American cots, backrests, etc, should be brought in by Glider. In order to transport this heavy load on the ground, jeeps and trailers are also taken.

A very suitable light collapsible trailer which carries 12 airborne panniers has been designed by our Transport Officer to go in the Glider. One Horsa Glider will carry a jeep, trailer and about 2 tons of operational stores; 2 such loads therefore will suffice to complete our minimal first line supply of equipment.

4). Where the Brigade Group is to be employed in a restricted area – holding vital ground or holding the perimeter of a bridgehead, Detachments of the Field ambulance of 1 Officer and 9 Other ranks attached to the battalion’s are adequate. Where terrain permits the ideal form of evacuation from R.A.P. to M.D.S. is by stretcher -fitted jeep. This would enable the detachments to be withdrawn at any early stage to the M.D.S. where it is unlikely there can ever be to many M.O’s or Orderlies.

5). The inclusion of the Quartermaster and team in the parachute lift with the task of collecting medical re-supply proved invaluable, and would have been of more value if the re-supply dropping had been more successful. We insist on pre-packing all our air re-supply panniers within the Unit. The specialised work involved is quite beyond the scope of either Medical Stores or any Air supply organisation in the theatre. This means several weeks detailed work before an operation.

6). The necessity of allotting adequate accommodation to the Field Ambulance was proved in Op ‘Dragoon’. The original intention, in the planning stage, to share a hamlet with Bde HQ had to be adopted as a temporary measure since the site selected for the M.D.S. was not considered safe until late on D-Day. This was quite inadequate, the area being greatly overcrowded, because in addition to Bde HQ, Div HQ also shared the hamlet. When the selected site was occupied it was adequate for the number of cases admitted, but had there been much serious fighting it would soon have become swamped.

It is useless to organise and equip adequately  Surgical Centre and expect it to function in a barn or a couple of outhouses. The Field ambulance must be given the biggest and best accommodation, if this happens to be a prominent landmark the Field Ambulance must rely upon the enemy respecting the re cross for protection from Arty fire.

The best accommodation is required not only to house casualties but also for the local resources, i.e: Beds, tables, etc, it will contain.

7). Experience shows that the amount and type of medical equipment required for an Airborne operation will vary according to the type of operation. It is therefore considered essential that the second in Command of the Field Ambulance and the Surgeon must be put in the picture early in the planning stage.

J.P. Parkinson,

Lieut Col, R.A.M.C.

127 Parachute Field Ambulance.

21 May 45.